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Abstract
Two of the largest futures commission merchants (“FMCs”)—MF Global
and Peregrine Financial Group—filed for bankruptcy in 2011 and 2012,
respectively. The bankruptcies of two of the largest players in the futures
commodity market shook up the industry. Many customers became weary and
distrustful of FCMs. This Article proposes solutions in order to boost customer
confidence in the futures market without deterring the largest futures traders.
Further, this Article discusses the pitfalls of the current regulatory model with
respect to customer segregated funds and the necessary changes to the current
regime by the CFTC and other self-regulatory organizations. After the MF Global
and Peregrine Financial bankruptcies, the CFTC and other self-regulatory
organizations put forth additional requirements for increased protection of
customer segregated funds held by FCMs. Solutions discussed in this Article
include an industry funded insurance pool, the use of third party custodial
accounts, a customer guaranty fund, and a central customer funds repository. This
Article recommends a short term proposal of an optional customer guaranty fund
and a long term proposal of a central customer funds repository.
I. Introduction
Daryl Larson, a cattle and wheat farmer from McPherson, Kansas, who
utilizes the futures commodity market to sell his crops and to hedge the risk of
commodity price fluctuation, sums up his confidence in the current futures
market: “There’s basically three places, only, that I trust people in suits and that’s
at church, weddings and funerals.” 1 Larson’s lack of trust in the futures market is
*
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1. Jeremy Bernfeld, Markets Woo Wary Farmers, HARVEST PUB. MEDIA (July 18, 2012, 8:33 AM),
http://harvestpublicmedia.org/article/1316/futures-markets-cme-group-woo-wary-farmers/5;
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not because of the year-long drought or the global economic downturn. 2 Instead,
his lack of trust derives from a year when two of the most trusted futures
commission merchants (“FCM”), 3 MF Global Holdings Company (“MF Global”)
and Peregrine Financial Group(“Peregrine Financial”), filed for bankruptcy in the
midst of fraud, million/billion dollar losses, and vanishing customer segregated
funds. 4 In a market that depends on customer confidence, the futures commodity
market is moving backwards. 5 In the light of the bankruptcies of MF Global and
Peregrine Financial, the futures commodity market must evaluate and implement
certain regulatory and systematic structural changes to boost customer confidence
in the market without deterring the largest futures traders. This Article provides
an overview of viable options for the market to consider.
On October 31, 2011, MF Global filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection. 6 After this filing, regulators and court personnel found that legally
customer segregated funds of MF Global had vanished. 7 As the dust settled, it was
reported that over $1.6 billon legally customer segregated funds were not
accounted for and could not be transferred to customers or other FCMs. 8 Today,
the MF Global bankruptcy proceedings are still ongoing, and bankruptcy trustee
James Giddens is still trying to make customers whole. 9 The MF Global debacle
shook the futures industry because it was the first time that legally customer
segregated funds could not be located by a defaulting FCM. 10 The loss of customer
segregated funds created much concern across the industry and in Congress.
Anxieties magnified exponentially nine months later when Peregrine
Financial Group filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy protection on July 7, 2012. 11 The
bankruptcy was a result of Peregrine Financial’s CEO Russell Wasendorf’s
fraudulent misappropriations of legally customer segregated funds, and
falsification of regulatory compliance documents with the Commodity Futures
Bernfeld, After MF Global Crisis, Farmers May Hedge on Hedging, HARVEST PUB. MEDIA (Jan. 3, 2012),
http://harvestpublicmedia.org/article/941/after-mf-global-crisis-farmers-may-hedge-hedging/5.
2. See Bernfeld, Markets Woo Wary Farmers, supra note 1.
3. Futures commission merchants are “[i]ndividuals, associations, partnerships, corporations, and
trusts that solicit or accept orders for the purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery on or subject
to the rules of any exchange and that accept payment from or extend credit to those whose orders are
accepted.” Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1a(28) (2012).
4. Id.
5. Terrance Duffy, A Year After MF Global Failure, Customers Safer Than Before Collapse, FUTURES
MAGAZINE (Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.futuresmag.com/2012/10/30/a-tear-after-mf-global-failure-customerssafer-tha. “For more than 160 years, no customer had ever lost a penny as the result of default by a futures
industry clearing member. MF Global’s failure last October, followed by fraud at PFGBest nine months later,
shattered this uninterrupted legacy of trust in our industry.” Id.
6. Voluntary Petition for Chpt. 11 Bankruptcy, In re MF Global Holdings Ltd., No. 11-15059 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2011), available at http://mfglobalcaseinfo.com/pdflib/1_15059.pdf.
7. Investigative Hearing on the MF Global Bankr.: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Agric., Nutrition
& Forestry, 111th Cong. (2011) (opening statement of Chairwoman Debbie Stabenow), available at
http://www.ag.senate.gov/hearings/investigative-hearing-on-the-mf-global-bankruptcy.
8. Examining the Futures Mkts.: Responding to the Failure of MF Global & Peregrine Fin. Grp.:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Agric., Nutrition & Forestry, 112th Cong. (2012) (testimony by James
Giddens, Trustee for Securities Investment Protection Act Liquidation of MF Global, Inc.), available at
http://www.ag.senate.gov/hearings/examining-the-futures-markets-responding-to-the-failures-of-mf-globaland-peregrine-financial-group.
9. See id.
10. See Duffy, supra note 5.
11. Voluntary Petition for Chpt. 7 Bankruptcy, In re Peregrine Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 12-27488 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. July 7, 2012), available at http://www.omnimgt.com/CMSVol/CMSDocs/pub_46535/318703_1.pdf.
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Trading Commission (“CFTC”). 12 Following the bankruptcy of Peregrine
Financial, the CFTC filed a civil lawsuit against Wasendorf and his company
alleging the CEO had misappropriated more than $200 million in customer
funds. 13 Wasendorf subsequently pled guilty to federal criminal charges of
“making and using false statements [to] the Government of the United States” and
to embezzling more than $200 million of legally customer segregated funds. 14
In the aftermath of these events in the futures commodity market, it is clear
that customers who provide funds to FCMs are entitled to enhanced legal
protection from potentially unlawful practices of FCMs. 15 Thus, this Article
considers the viability of an industry sponsored insurance fund for the futures
commodity markets that would mimic the insurance fund provided for securities
by the Securities Investor Protection Act (“SIPA”). 16 With this type of insurance
fund, a cost-benefit analysis is appropriate along with an examination of other
options, as considered in Part IV. An implementation of an optional Guaranty Fund
is a short-term solution that would provide immediate protection for customer
segregated funds. In the long term, however, regulators need to implement a total
segregation model, such as a Central Customer Funds Repository, an idea
suggested by former CFTC Chairman Philip McBride Johnson. 17
First, Part II offers a brief discussion of how the collapses of MF Global and
Peregrine Financial led to a hearing in front of the U.S. Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry (“Senate Committee”). Then, this Article
outlines the current regime of FCM regulation and the self-regulatory model used
by the futures market. In addition, this Article focuses on the failures of the
regulatory model with respect to customer segregated funds, and the necessary
regulatory changes that will need to be implemented by the CFTC and
self-regulatory organizations (“SRO”).
Then, Part IV examines the viability of an industry sponsored insurance
fund. Part IV studies the positives and negatives of the creation of such an
insurance fund and the amount of congressional support necessary for the
implementation of such a fund. Part V then contemplates the possible alternatives
available other than an industry sponsored insurance fund. The conclusion
recommends the creation of an optional Guaranty Fund as the best immediate
solution for futures market participants and provides that regulators and
Congress must consider a total segregation model such as the Central Customer
Fund Repository for long term protection for customer segregated funds.
12. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief and Civil Monetary Penalties Under the
Commodity Exchange Act, CFTC v. Peregrine Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 1:12-cv-05383 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 2012),
available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfpfg
complaint071012.pdf.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Examining the Futures Markets: Responding to the Failure of MF Global & Peregrine Fin. Grp.:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Agric., Nutrition & Forestry, 112th Cong. (Aug. 1, 2012) [hereinafter Hearing
on Futures Markets] (testimony by Hon. Gary Gensler Chairman, CFTC), available at http://www.ag.
senate.gov/hearings/examining-the-futures-markets-responding-to-the-failures-of-mf-global-and-peregrinefinancial-group.
16. See Bart Chilton & John L. Roe, Can an Insurance Fund Make the Once Sacred Segregated Account
Safe Again?, OPALESQUE (Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.opalesque.com/OFI1292/Can_an_Insurance_Fund_Make
_the_Once_Sacred292.html.
17. Philip McBride Johnson, A Central Customer Funds Repository: Fact Sheet, at 1 (2012) (on file with
author).
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II. The Background and Impact of the Bankruptcies of
MF Global Ltd. and Peregrine Financial Group
A. MF Global Profile
MF Global was a well-respected commodities and securities brokerage firm
in the modern financial markets. 18 MF Global was an FCM and a registered
broker-dealer that, as a financial intermediary, held customers’ cash accounts and
collateral. 19 The global company was active in “markets for commodities, fixed
income securities, equities, and foreign exchanges.” 20 Primarily, MF Global placed
and held trades on behalf of customers and made trades with their own proprietary
accounts. 21 Along with trading as a registered FCM and broker-dealer, MF Global
provided clearing and settlement services, market research services, and market
commentary services for active market participants. 22
B. MF Global Bankruptcy
In 2005, the CFTC amended regulatory Rule 1.5, which allowed FCMs to
invest legally segregated customer funds in riskier investments such as sovereign
debt instruments. FCMs were only able to make these investments in sovereign
debt if the sovereign government bonds maintained the highest credit rating from
three of the leading credit agencies. 23 After John Corzine became the CEO of MF
Global in March 2010, the FCM took on a more aggressive investment strategy for
its proprietary investments. 24 This aggressive proprietary trading strategy
leveraged MF Global’s investments, and these leveraged investments included
positions in sovereign debt. 25 The market as a whole became concerned that MF
Global exposed itself to too much risk by holding leveraged positions in sovereign
debt instruments. 26
Although the aggressive trading strategy of MF Global made investors
concerned about the firm’s profitability, it was not the sole cause of the
bankruptcy. Corzine testified to the Senate Committee that the repurchase
agreements 27 MF Global had entered into in connection with its sovereign debt
Voluntary Petition for Chpt. 11 Bankruptcy, supra note 6.
John L. Roe & James L. Koutoulas, White Paper: Background, Impacts & Solutions to MF Global's
Demise, COMMODITY CUSTOMER COALITION (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.scribd.com/doc/74527661/CCCMFGlobal-White-Paper-Revised-12-1-11.
20. Voluntary Petition for Chpt. 11 Bankruptcy, supra note 6.
21. See Roe & Koutoulas, supra note 19.
22. Voluntary Petition for Chpt. 11 Bankruptcy, supra note 6.
23. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.25; R. Tamara de Silva, MF Global’s Missing Customer Funds and Its Implications
on the Futures Industry, TIMELY OBJECTIONS BLOG (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.timelyobjections.com/2011/11/
mf-globals-missing-customer-funds-and-its-implications-on-the-futures-industry.html; Investigative Hearing
on the MF Global Bankr., supra note 7 (testimony by Jill Sommers, Comm’r, CFTC).
24. See Roe & Koutoulas, supra note 19.
25. Id.
26. Investigative Hearing on the MF Global Bankr., supra note 7 (testimony by Bradley Abelow,
President & CFO, MF Global Holdings Ltd.) (“First, it appeared that by mid-October of this year the market
had become increasingly concerned with the firm’s exposure to European sovereign debt.”).
27. “A form of short-term borrowing for dealers in government securities. The dealer sells the
government securities to investors, usually on an overnight basis, and buys them back the following day.”
18.
19.
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investments did not display losses. 28 Corzine and other high-ranking officers of
MF Global claimed that a cut in MF Global’s credit rating by Moody’s and
Standard and Poor’s was due to an adverse valuation adjustment against one of
the firm’s deferred tax assets 29 and that a poor earnings record doomed the
company to bankruptcy. 30
Whatever the cause, on October 25, 2011, MF Global announced a quarterly
loss of $191.6 million. 31 After this announcement, Corzine stated MF Global had
done its best to unwind customer positions to avoid losses, and the firm sold a
mass amount of commercial paper instruments and corporate securities to boost
marketplace confidence. 32 Yet, these last efforts were to no avail and MF Global
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on October 31, 2011. 33 At this time,
Chicago Mercantile Exchange Clearing (“CME Clearing”) and the Derivative
Clearing Organizations (“DCO”) handling trades on behalf of MF Global,
liquidated the positions held by MF Global. When exchanges and SROs inquired
about the loss, MF Global’s management “could not account for many hundreds of
millions of dollars” of customer funds held by the firm. 34 Thus, it was clear that
there was a shortfall in segregated customer funds and MF Global’s management
did not know the extent of the deficit or where exactly the customer funds were. 35
In the midst of suffering losses in its investment positions, MF Global must have
transferred customer segregated accounts to house accounts, which is a violation
of the Commodity Exchange Act of 1967. 36
C. Peregrine Financial Company Profile
Peregrine Financial was a registered FCM who brokered and handled its
clients’ futures and options trades. 37 Peregrine Financial offered a wide range of
products that included futures contracts, foreign exchange products, options, full
brokerage services, precious metal trades, trader education, and direct online
trading services. 38 For thirteen straight years, Futures Magazine had listed
Peregrine Financial as “one of the nation’s top 50 brokers” with assets of around

Definition of “Repurchase Agreement”, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/repurchase
agreement.asp#axzz2C4PIE1Sv (last visited Aug. 31, 2013).
28. Id.
29. A deferred tax asset is “an asset on a company’s balance sheet that may be used to reduce any
subsequent period’s income tax expense.” Deferred Tax Assets, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/d/deferredtaxasset.asp#axzz2B5JE8QMc (last visited Aug. 31, 2013).
30. Investigative Hearing on the MF Global Bankr., supra note 7 (testimony by John Corzine, Former
Chairman & CEO, MF Global Holdings Ltd.).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. (testimony by Bradley Abelow, President & COO, MF Global Holdings Ltd.).
34. News Releases: CME Group Statement Regarding MF Global, CME GRP. (Nov. 2, 2011),
http://cmegroup.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=3202&pagetemplate=article; Investigative Hearing
on the MF Global Bankr., supra note 7 (testimony by John Corzine, Former Chairman & CEO, MF Global
Holdings Ltd.).
35. Id.
36. See Investigative Hearing on the MF Global Bankr., supra note 7 (testimony by Terrance Duffy,
Exec. Chairman, CME Grp.).
37. See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(28) (2012); see Business Entities Results, IOWA SEC’Y OF STATE, http://sos.iowa.gov/
search/business/(S(4espczevlxnves55epdzle2d))/results.aspx (last visited Aug. 31, 2013).
38. Welcome to PFGBest, PFGBEST, http://www.pfgbest.com/about/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2013).
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$500 million. 39 The FCM also provided technologies to assist and advance the
execution of futures trades for the benefit of a wide range of customers. 40
D. Peregrine Financial Bankruptcy
In July 2012, the National Futures Association (“NFA”), one of the SROs of
the futures market, conducted an audit of Peregrine Financial. 41 A Peregrine’s
financial regulatory report claimed Peregrine Financial held in excess of $220
million in its customer segregated accounts; yet, the NFA audit found only $5.1
million in customer segregated accounts. 42 The NFA’s audit also revealed that the
CEO of Peregrine Financial, Russell Wasendorf Sr., falsified bank records and
regulatory filings. 43
Subsequent to these findings, the NFA and the CFTC filed a civil lawsuit
against Peregrine Financial indicating that Wasendorf misappropriated customer
funds since February 2010. 44 With the accusations of fraud and deceit swirling,
Peregrine Financial filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy on July 10, 2012. 45
E. The Collapse of MF Global and Peregrine Financial and the Impact on the
Commodity Futures Market
Initially, the collapse of MF Global was viewed as an isolated event that did
not impact stability of the futures commodity market. 46 However, as more facts
came to light and customers were told that more than $1.6 billion customer funds
were missing and unaccounted for, many market participants began to lose faith
in the commodities futures market. 47 Nine months later, when Peregrine
Financial filed for bankruptcy, many customers incurred a loss, some a second
loss, in their customer segregated accounts. 48 The bankruptcy of Peregrine
Financial and MF Global demonstrated that there was a systematic flaw in the
regulatory structure of the commodity futures market and customer segregated
funds were in need of a higher level of protection. 49

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief and Civil Monetary Penalties Under the
Commodity Exchange Act, supra note 12.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Voluntary Petition for Chpt. 7 Bankruptcy, supra note 6.
46. Id. (“Some might conclude that the system failed because of this one instance when customers have
been injured despite the prescribed system of segregation. Regulatory failures happen, unfortunately . . . a
firm failed to comply with applicable rules, but that does not mean the segregation system is a failed system.”).
47. Marcy Nicholson & Frank Tang, Insight–U.S. Commodity Markets Shrink After MF Global Failure,
REUTERS (Dec. 21, 2011, 10:23 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/12/21/uk-mfglobal-futures-idUKTRE7
BK1E220111221?type=GCA-ForeignExchange (“U.S. commodity markets have shrunk almost 9 percent since
MF Global’s collapse as farmers, investors and traders close out positions, . . . that suggests there may be
lasting effects from the industry’s most disruptive broker failure.”).
48. Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15 (testimony by Diana Klemme, Vice President & Dir. of
the Grain Div., Grain Serv. Corp.).
49. Daniel Collins & Michael McFarlin, PFGBest Mess Raises Systemic Issues for Futures Industry,
FUTURES MAGAZINE (July 10, 2012), http://www.futuresmag.com/2012/07/10/pfgbest-mess-raises-systemicissues-for-futures-in.
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F. The Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and
Forestry
On August 1, 2012, the Senate Committee held a hearing to discuss the
progress of the MF Global and Peregrine Financial bankruptcies. The Senate
Committee held this meeting because many of the customers who suffered losses
from the above bankruptcies were agricultural farmers and cooperatives—the
very constituents the Senate Committee is designed to work with—who use
futures markets to hedge price risk by entering derivative contracts. 50 At the
hearing, Senators were concerned with how the industry or Congress could provide
more protection to customer funds that are legally segregated from the FCM’s
proprietary funds. 51 Also, the Committee wanted to hear that the CFTC and
industry leaders were in the process of creating ways to better protect customer
funds. 52
Three different panels consisting of regulatory and industry leaders from
the CFTC, the NFA, CME Group, the Futures Industry Association (“FIA”), and
the Commodity Customer Coalition responded to questions from Congress on the
changes considered for the futures market. 53 One of the main lines of inquiry by
the Senate Committee members was the viability of an industry sponsored
insurance fund that would indemnify customer losses when customer segregated
funds were misappropriated by failing FCMs. 54 Other solutions and
recommendations were discussed, but the focus of the hearing revolved around the
idea of the creation of an insurance fund. 55
G. The CFTC Roundtable on the Protection of Customer Segregated Funds
The CFTC held a roundtable hearing on August 9, 2012 to discuss ways the
commodity futures industry could more effectively protect customer segregated
funds and restore confidence in the market. 56 In these deliberations, the industryfunded insurance idea was the main thrust of the debate, but other considerations
included third party custodial accounts and a Customer Protection Guaranty
fund. 57 Part IV considers these ideas more fully; however, a basic understanding
of the current regulatory system of FCMs and customer segregated funds, as
discussed below, is necessary to provide a framework for these alternatives.

50. Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15 (opening statements by Chairwoman Debbie Stabenow).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id. (each panel member for the Hearing provided recommendations for more protections for
customer segregated funds. Every member on the panel took a position on the idea of an industry sponsored
insurance fund).
55. Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15 (opening statements by Chairwoman Debbie Stabenow).
56. See generally CFTC Staff to Host a Public Roundtable to Discuss Additional Customer Protections,
CFTC (Aug. 9, 2012), transcript available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents
/file/transcript080912.pdf.
57. See id. at 234–321.
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III. Regulation of FCMs and Their Customer Segregated Funds
A. Statutorily Mandated Customer Segregated Accounts

1. Commodity Exchange Act
The Commodity Exchange Act, as amended by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 58 mandates that all customer funds 59 held
by an FCM must be segregated from the proprietary funds of the FCM. 60 These
customer funds “shall not be commingled with the [FCM’s own accounts] or used
. . . to margin or guarantee the trades or contracts, or to secure or extend the credit
of any customer . . . other than for” the customer who provided the funds to the
FCM. 61 The customer funds, however, may be commingled for convenience with
other customer funds in the same account or accounts held within any third party
bank, trust company, or clearing house organization. 62 Thus, the Act clearly
mandates that FCMs shall not commingle customer funds with proprietary
funds. 63

2. CFTC Regulations
The CFTC also provides a regulatory scheme that requires customer funds
to be segregated from the FCM’s proprietary funds. 64 The regulation states no
person, clearing organization, or third party depository entity receiving customer
segregated funds “may hold, dispose of or use any [customer] funds for” anyone
other than the option or commodity customer. 65 Further, all customer segregated
funds must be sequestered from the FCMs property or any other person, and third
party depository entities must acknowledge that they are holding customer
accounts on behalf of the FCMs. 66 Thus, the regulatory scheme goes to great
lengths to reiterate the rule that customer funds shall be segregated from the
proprietary funds of the FCM.

58. Pub. L. No. 111-203, H.R. 4173.
59. Customer funds are defined as “all money, securities, and property received by a futures commission
merchant or by a clearing organization from, for, or on behalf of customers or options customers.” 17 C.F.R.
§ 1.3(gg) (2012).
60. See 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(2).
61. Id.
62. See id. On January 11, 2012, the CFTC approved final rules relating to the segregation model for
Cleared Swaps which impacts the FCMs. See generally SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, CLIENT PUBLICATION:
CFTC ADOPTS FINAL RULES ON PROTECTION OF CLEARED SWAPS COLLATERAL (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.shear
man.com/files/Publication/62be6e9da97041ba8c9fed2b61c8479c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/27c6ca
1e-2f90-41f7-b7d6-cbff6485eb94/CFTC-Adopts-Final-Rules-on-Protection-of-Cleared-Swaps-Customer-Collat
eral-DR-020112.pdf. The CFTC adopted the Legal Segregation with Operational Commingling Model (LSOC
Model) which “allows FCMs and DCOs to commingle the collateral of their cleared swaps customers in a
segregated omnibus customer account pre-bankruptcy. However, FCMs and DCOs may not (i) commingle
cleared swaps collateral with other property or collateral (including futures margin or property and collateral
belonging to the FCM or DCO) or (ii) use the collateral of one cleared swaps customer for the benefit of any
other customer.” Id.
63. See 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(2) (2012).
64. 17 C.F.R. § 1.20 (2012).
65. Id.
66. 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.20(a), (c) (2012).
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Indeed, federal regulations require, with limited exception, that each
registered FCM make regulatory filings at the close of business each month and
at the close of each fiscal year to monitor customer segregated funds. 67
Independent accountants certify the CFTC Form 1-FR-FCM filings, then the SROs
and the CFTC review the forms to observe the financial condition of each
registered FCM. 68 Within Form 1-FR-FCM, the regulations mandate a “statement
of segregation requirements and funds in segregation for customers trading on
U.S. commodity exchanges and for customers’ dealer options accounts.” 69 In other
words, FCMs are required by law to provide an accounting of all customer funds
held in these segregated accounts to the CFTC.
FCMs must also account, “monitor, and compute their segregation
requirements and customer funds on deposit in segregated accounts on a daily
basis and maintain copies of these reports, commonly known as a ‘daily
segregation computation.’” 70 The daily segregation computation must be
calculated at the close of each business day by reviewing the following: “the total
amount of customer funds on deposit in segregated accounts . . . the amount of
customer funds required by the [CEA] and these regulations to be on deposit in
segregated accounts . . . and the amount of the FCMs residual interest in customer
funds.” 71 The daily segregation computations must be kept by the FCM for five
years, and the records shall be open to inspection by any representative of the
CFTC or the Department of Justice. 72
In addition to the daily recordkeeping activities for customer segregated
funds, the FCMs must also keep each commodity customer updated on the amount
and activity of the customer segregated accounts. 73 FCMs must inform each
customer on a monthly basis the contracts that are open for each customer, the
net unrealized profits or losses on the open contracts, any customer funds carried
with the [FCM], and the charges and credits realized on the customer accounts. 74
Clearly, the CFTC, by these mandatory regulations, makes it a priority to monitor
the customer segregated funds held by FCMs.

3. Self-Regulatory Organizations
The SROs are the parties that receive the regulatory filings completed by
the registered FCMs because the SROs are the frontline regulators of the futures
market. 75 Accompanying the federal regulations, the SROs have their own
internal requirements that designated FCMs must comply with. 76 The NFA and
CME Group require that all FCMs follow the appropriate CFTC regulations
67. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.10(b) (2012).
68. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.10(a)(2)(i)(A)(1), (a)(3)(i) (2012).
69. 17 C.F.R. § 1.10(d)(v) (2012).
70. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief and Civil Monetary Penalties Under the
Commodity Exchange Act, supra note 12; see 17 C.F.R. § 1.32 (2012).
71. 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.32(a)(1)–(3) (2012).
72. 17 C.F.R. § 1.31 (a)(1) (2012).
73. 17 C.F.R. § 1.33(a)(1) (2012).
74. 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.33(a)(1)(i–iii) (2012).
75. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.10(a)(2)(i)(A)(1), (a)(3)(i) (2012); Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 2–
3 (testimony by Comm’r Gary Gensler).
76. See NFA Manual/Rules, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N (2012), http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/NFAMa
nualTOC.aspx?Section=7; see CME Rulebook, CME GRP. (2012), http://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/CME/.
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regarding customer segregated funds, and that FCMs follow a DCO’s rules when
using customer funds to post margin for or on behalf of customers. 77
The NFA and CME Group further mandate that each member FCM must
maintain written policies and procedures regarding the maintenance of the FCM’s
residual interest in its customer segregated funds accounts, as identified in CFTC
Regulation 1.20. 78 The residual interest is a surplus fund provided by the FCM
within its customer segregated accounts to ensure that the FCM can meet its
obligations to all of its customers. 79 The FCM residual interest within customer
segregated accounts is there to cover any customer account deficits until a
delinquent customer remedies the account deficit. 80 Under the NFA rules, “no
FCM may withdraw, transfer, or . . . disburse funds” from any “customer
segregated fund account” that “exceed[s] 25% of the FCM’s residual interest in
customer segregated funds based upon the most current daily segregated funds
calculation” unless the FCM’s officers preapprove in writing the segregated funds
disbursement that exceeds the twenty-five percent threshold, and the FCM
provides written notice that informs its respective SRO of the disbursement. 81
The SROs impose a reporting requirement on the FCMs in this compliance
scheme. 82 The NFA and CME Group must report financial and operational
information on a monthly, biweekly, and daily basis. 83 The monthly filings ask
FCMs “whether any depository used to hold customer segregated funds or foreign
futures and foreign options customer secured amount funds during the month is
an affiliate of the FCM” while the biweekly and daily filings ask for “the dollar
amount of customer segregated funds” and “the identity of each depository holding
customer segregated funds and the dollar amount held at each depository.” 84 By
having access to these filings, the SRO’s are able to monitor and cross reference
the amount of funds held in customer segregated accounts. The NFA assesses a
$1,000 fine against an FCM for each day the FCM fails to meet the deadlines for
each separate filing. 85
Finally, CME Group’s clearing house and other DCOs attempt to safeguard
customer segregated accounts if an FCM defaults. 86 If an FCM defaults, CME’s
clearing group, CME Clearing Inc., will “transfer non-involved customer
77. See NFA Manual: Section 16, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N (Sept. 2012), http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaMa
nual/NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=SECTION%2016&Section=7; Chapter 9: Clearing Members. Sec. 971Segregation, Secured and Sequestered Requirements, CME GRP. 23 (2012), available at http://www.cme
group.com/rulebook/CME/I/9/9.pdf.
78. See NFA Manual: Section 16, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N (Sept. 2012), http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaMa
nual/NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=SECTION%2016&Section=7; Chapter 9: Clearing Members, supra note 77.
79. See id.
80. Securities Representing Investment of Customer Funds Held in Segregated Accounts by Futures
Commission Merchants, 62 Fed. Reg. 42,398, 42,399 (Aug. 7, 1997) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 1.23, 1.25).
81. See NFA Manual: Section 16(b)(i-ii), NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N (Sept. 2012), http://www.nfa.futures.org/
nfaManual/NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=SECTION%2016&Section=7; see Chapter 9: Clearing Members, supra
note 77, at 24.
82. See NFA Manual: Section 16(d)(i-iv), NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N (Sept. 2012), http://www.nfa.futures.org/
nfaManual/NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=SECTION%2016&Section=7; see Chapter 9: Clearing Members, supra
note 78, at 23–24.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See NFA Manual: Section 16(d)(v), NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N (Sept. 2012), http://www.nfa.futures.org/
nfaManual/NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=SECTION%2016&Section=7.
86. See CME Clearing Financial Safeguards, CME GRP. 15 (2012), available at http://www.cmegroup.com
/clearing/files/financialsafeguards.pdf.
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segregated positions and collateral” to other member FCMs of the clearing
organization. 87 CME Clearing will then “liquidate [the] involved customer
segregated . . . positions” and any FCM proprietary positions at the time of the
default. 88 A defaulting FCM’s margin deposits, residual interest in customer
segregated funds, and any other assets available from the FCM will be applied to
the defaulting FCM’s failed trading obligations. 89
The problem with an FCM default with regards to customer segregated
accounts is as follows: a customer segregated account is not provided “complete
protection if an FCM’s default to CME Clearing results from a shortfall in
customer segregated funds.” 90 CME Group explains, “If a default [by an FCM] to
CME Clearing occurred in the FCM’s customer segregated . . . accounts, CME
Clearing has the right to apply toward the default all [margin] deposits and
positions within the respective account at CME Clearing.” 91 Thus, innocent
customers who did not cause the default are at risk of losing their position and
margin deposits if there is a default of an FCM customer using the same clearing
house (i.e., CME Clearing). 92 In summary, SROs, specifically CME Group, provide
safeguards to customer segregated accounts in the case of an FCM default. 93
However, a default of an FCM caused by a shortfall in customer segregated
accounts still threatens a risk of loss to non-involved customers of the failing
FCM. 94 In short, this is called Fellow Customer Risk. Fellow Customer Risk is “the
risk that margin posted by one customer of an FCM will be used to cover a loss
caused by a different customer of that FCM in the event of the failure of the
FCM.” 95
B. The Failure of the Regulatory System in MF Global and Peregrine Financial
In the wake of the bankruptcies of MF Global and Peregrine Financial, it
became clear that the regulatory system for customer segregated funds, as
described above, failed to protect the interests of FCM customers. 96 The futures
market will thrive only if customers have confidence that their funds are safe in
the event of an FCM default. 97 Thus, it is imperative that Congress, the CFTC,
and the SROs work together to establish a regulatory framework that restores
confidence to the futures market. 98 The CFTC and the SROs have taken steps to
update and strengthen the regulatory system after the bankruptcies of MF Global
and Peregrine Financial.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 16.
Id.
See id. at 15–16.
See id.
Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 5–6 (testimony by Comm’r Gary Gensler); see
generally SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, supra note 62.
96. See Collins & McFarlin, supra note 49.
97. See id; see Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 2 (testimony by Dan Roth, President &
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

CEO, Nat’l Futures Ass’n) (“For our markets to thrive, customers must know that their funds are safe.”).
98. See Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 5–6 (testimony by Comm’r Gary Gensler).
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C. Recently Implemented Changes to Regulatory Compliance

1. Post-MF Global and Peregrine Financial Regulatory Changes by CFTC
Since the collapse of MF Global and Peregrine Financial, the CFTC has
made many changes to the regulatory system for the futures market, starting with
Rule 1.25. 99 Rule 1.25 concerns the investment of customer segregated funds by
restricting how FCMs can invest customer segregated funds. 100 Under the former
Rule 1.25, the CFTC substantially expanded the list of acceptable, and riskier,
investments for customer segregated funds. 101 Many commentators believe this is
what led to the collapse of MF Global. 102 In response to MF Global’s collapse, the
CFTC amended Rule 1.25 to retract the expansive amendments that occurred
between 2000 and 2005 while re-establishing a more customer sensitive regime by
only allowing FCMs to invest customer segregated funds in low risk, low-volume
investments such as U.S. government securities, municipal securities, commercial
paper, corporate notes or bonds, and money market mutual funds. 103 More
specifically, the amendments prohibited FCMs to invest in high risk securities like
foreign sovereign debt. 104
Second, the CFTC mandated that clearing houses collect margin on a gross
basis while denying FCMs the ability to offset one customer’s collateral with
another customer’s collateral. 105 FCMs will not be able to send just the net
required margin to the clearing house. 106 Instead, the DCO will collect margin and
transmit on a gross basis. 107 For example, the old model would allow an FCM to
post net initial margin, which is the difference between its total long and short
positions on a given reference commodity. If an FCM had eighty short positions
and 100 long positions, the FCM would only have to post initial margin to the DCO
for the twenty positions not covered. Now, however, the FCM must post initial
margin to the DCO for every position held as if every customer was a member of
the DCO. So, the FCM would have to post initial gross margin for all 180 positions
to the DCO.
In addition to this new margin requirement, the CFTC added more
customer protection for cleared swap participants with the implementation of the
legal segregation with operational comingling rule (“LSOC Rule”). 108 The LSOC
Rule provides protection to individual customers at the clearing house level of the
99. Speeches & Testimony- Statement of Support: Enhancements for the Protection of Customers and
Customer Funds, CFTC (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/genslerstate

ment102312.
100. See 17 C.F.R. 1.25; see Press Release: Customer Funds Investment Rules, FUTURES MAGAZINE (Dec.
27, 2011), http://www.futuresmag.com/2011/12/27/customer-funds-investment-rules.
101. See Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 5–6 (testimony by Comm’r Gary Gensler); see
Press Release, supra note 100.
102. Id.
103. See Investment of Customer Funds and Funds Held in Account for Foreign Futures and Foreign
Options Transactions: Final Rule, CFTC 11 (Dec. 5, 2011), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/
public/@newsroom/documents/file/federalregister120511a.pdf.
104. See id.
105. Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 5–6 (testimony by Comm’r Gary Gensler).
106. Id.; Speeches & Testimony, supra note 99.
107. Id.
108. Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 5–6 (testimony by Comm’r Gary Gensler); see supra
note 91 and accompanying text.
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futures markets by reducing Fellow Customer Risk. 109 The LSOC Rule has not
been extended to benefit futures customers or futures transactions; however,
CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler indicated an interest in further consideration of
the LSOC Rule’s application to the futures market.” 110 The CFTC conducted a
roundtable on the topic in February 2012, but no formal action has been taken by
the CFTC. 111
Lastly, the CFTC has recently implemented on the federal level many of the
requirements that are already required by the NFA. 112 By incorporating some of
the NFA’s compliance structure, the CFTC directs FCMs to “maintain written
policies and procedures governing the maintenance of excess funds in customer
segregated accounts.” 113 As with the SRO rules, this new regulatory requirement
requires a written pre-approval by senior management of the FCM and disclosure
to the SROs and the CFTC when the FCM has withdrawn more than twenty-five
percent of the customer segregated accounts. 114 The CFTC also adopted the SRO
rule that an FCM must make a daily computation of customer segregated funds
and the FCM must also report bimonthly figures of cash deposits and investments
of customer funds to the SROs and the CFTC. 115 Thus, the CFTC reinforced the
importance that FCMs have a proprietary surplus fund that accompanies
customer segregated funds and ensures customers obligations.

2. Recent SRO Rule Changes
The CFTC was not the only one that made changes to its regulatory regime
after the collapses of MF Global and Peregrine Financial. 116 After these events,
the SROs came together to provide more protection to customer segregated funds.
On March 12, 2012 a special committee (“SRO Committee”) came together to make
recommendations on how to better segregate and protect customer funds. 117 The
SRO Committee included the NFA, CME Group, and representatives from the
other commodity exchanges, such as ICE, Kansas City Board of Trade, and
Minneapolis Grain Exchanges. 118 The SRO Committee established four
compliance rule changes, which have been adopted by each SRO. 119

109. Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 5–6 (testimony by Comm’r Gary Gensler); see
generally SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, supra note 62.
110. CFTC Adopts Final Rule on Protection of Cleared Swap Customer Collateral, DAVIS POLK &
WARDWELL 4 (Jan. 23, 2012), available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/c6a0afbb-08ab-4633-

b42e-22747253969b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/251babfe-a89a-4cf2-b01e-25566e38c435/012312_
LSOC.pdf.
111. Public Roundtable, CFTC 4-4-40 (Feb. 29, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/
@newsroom/documents/file/transcript022912am.pdf.
112. Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 5–6 (testimony by Comm’r Gary Gensler).
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 1–2 (testimony by Dan Roth, President & CEO, Nat’l
Futures Ass’n); Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 2–3 (testimony by Terrance Duffy, President
& CEO, CME Grp.).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1–2 (testimony by Terrance Duffy, President & CEO, CME Grp.).
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The first compliance rule change requires FCMs to file daily segregation
reports with their SROs. 120 Second, FCMs must also file bimonthly Segregation
Investment Detail Reports (“SIDR”), which must reflect “how customer segregated
funds are invested and where those funds are held.” 121 Third, since December
2011, SROs conducted more frequent spot checks on FCMs to monitor compliance
with segregation requirements. 122 Finally, all the SROs, and now the CFTC, have
implemented a rule that requires top executives to pre-approve disbursements
from customer segregated accounts that exceed the twenty-five percent residual
interest of the FCM’s proprietary funds held in customer segregated accounts. 123
Any involved SRO “must be immediately notified of this pre-approval.” 124

3. Proposals by the CFTC and SROs to Provide More Protection to
Customer Segregated Funds
In addition to the recent changes that were actually implemented in the
regulatory scheme, the CFTC and the SROs also have made a few more proposed
changes outside the rulemaking process on how to protect customer segregated
funds. 125 In a collaborative effort, the CFTC and the SROs have worked together
to provide more protection to customer segregated funds. 126
The first proposal is the creation of a direct electronic and online access view
of an FCM’s bank and custodial accounts housing customer funds, which would
allow the regulators to view an FCM’s customer accounts without the FCM’s
knowledge or approval. 127 The SROs have backed this proposal because it would
allow the SROs to cross-check any customer segregated account balance with the
FCM’s daily segregation report. 128
A second proposal involves the implementation of more internal controls on
FCMs regarding customer segregated accounts. 129 The Futures Industry
Association (“FIA”) and the CFTC recommend controls that require FCMs to
separate compliance duties among employees responsible with protecting
customer funds. 130 Additional written procedures include policies for securities
valuation in customer segregated accounts or custodial accounts and selection of
banks, custodians and other depositories. 131 Lastly, the recommendations require
that the FCM have procedures to appropriately maintain and withdraw its
residual interest held in the customer segregated funds. 132
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 1–2 (testimony by Dan Roth, President & CEO, Nat’l
Futures Ass’n); Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 2–3 (testimony by Terrance Duffy, President
& CEO, CME Grp.).
129. See Speeches & Testimony, supra note 99; Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, 1–2
(testimony by Terrance Duffy, President & CEO, CME Grp.).
130. Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, 1–2 (testimony by Terrance Duffy, President & CEO,
CME Grp.); see Speeches & Testimony, supra note 99.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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A third proposal strengthens the current audit requirements that raise the
level of scrutiny provided by independent public accountants. 133 Accompanying
these auditing requirements, the CFTC and the SROs would like to implement
rules that would require FCMs to ensure FCMs have adequate funds to cover
potential margin deficits. 134
The fourth proposal is that the CFTC and the SROs implement a warning
system that will alert the regulators when “an FCM’s funds are insufficient to
meet the targeted residual interest in customer segregated accounts” or when
there is a material change in an FCM’s creditworthiness or clearing
arrangements. 135 A potential warning tool for regulators would be liquidity and
capital requirements imposed upon FCMs. 136 If an FCM deviated from the
standard, regulators would then be in a position to identify distressed FCMs. 137
The SROs also propose an e-confirmation system. 138 The e-confirmation
system is where the SROs confirm the amount of customer segregated accounts
within a bank or other depository institution that is holding an FCM’s customer
segregated funds. 139 This will provide for an immediate confirmation by an online
tool that would make the process smooth and efficient. 140 The e-confirmation tool
would allow SROs to audit each FCM to verify bimonthly Segregation Investment
Detail Reports and to verify the daily segregation statements. 141
The above proposals and recent regulatory changes to the futures market
seem like a good start to providing more protection to customer segregated funds;
yet, the regulatory and compliance changes do not remedy the concern that FCM’s
will mishandle customer segregated funds. In particular, where an individual or
company blatantly disregards the regulatory framework and files fraudulent
information, as with Peregrine Financial and MF Global, the new changes are
insufficient to provide protection of customer segregated funds. It is no stretch to
conclude the futures market was severely shaken by the recent collapses of MF
Global and Peregrine Financial. Thus, more dramatic measures might be
considered so that customers will feel safe in investing in the futures market. The
following part highlights some of the more innovative solutions considered by the
industry and Congress.
IV. An Industry Funded Insurance Pool and Market Alternatives
Concerned that more regulation was not a complete solution to the
protection of customer segregated funds, members of the CFTC and the industry
began to weigh options that could bring more protection to these accounts. First,
CFTC Commissioner Bart Chilton would create an industry funded insurance
pool. The industry considered the use of third party custodial accounts and a
133. See Speeches & Testimony, supra note 99.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 1–2 (testimony by Dan Roth, President & CEO, Nat’l
Futures Ass’n); Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 2–3 (testimony by Terrance Duffy, President
& CEO, CME Grp.).
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 1–2 (testimony by Terrance Duffy, President & CEO, CME Grp.).
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Customer Guaranty Fund. Finally, a former chairman of the CFTC has provided
a framework of a Central Customer Funds Repository. Each of these alternatives
is discussed below.
A. Commissioner Chilton’s Insurance Fund Proposal
CFTC Commissioner Chilton observed that many of the futures customers
who suffered losses from the collapse of MF Global were still not made whole while
the company’s security customers were quickly and efficiently provided payouts
by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”). 142 Commissioner
Chilton reasoned that the creation of a similar fund for commodities futures
customers is viable and he has provided a proposal of a Futures Investor and
Customer Protection Act (“FICPA”), which would basically extend the SIPC
protections to futures customers. 143 Chilton believes that this kind of insurance
protection would provide a solution for futures customers if an FCM filed for
bankruptcy in the face of a collapse. 144
Under his FICPA proposal, an initial fund would be created by assessing a
fee on every FCM’s previous year gross revenue from futures. 145 The fee assessed
would be no more than one-half percent of the FCM’s futures-specific gross
revenue. 146 Chilton’s plan would provide a pre-determined target level for the fund
that would never exceed $2.5 billon, and once this level was reached, the Futures
Investor and Customer Protection Corporation (“FICPC”), a congressionally
created corporation, could lower or suspend the premium collections. 147 Also,
Chilton said that this plan would establish discounts on the fee assessment for
revenues generated from commercial hedging or end-user customers. 148 This
discount would encourage customers to use the futures market for commercial
purposes. 149 In essence, FICPC would mimic SIPC. 150
Commissioner Chilton’s proposal is the first concrete proposal for an
industry sponsored insurance fund for customer segregated funds. 151 The U.S.
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry first considered the
insurance fund idea at a hearing held on August 1, 2012. 152 Also, many industry
leaders have considered the idea. 153 Some market participants support the
proposal while others believe the creation of an insurance fund is cost
142. See Chilton & Roe, supra note 16; see also Bart Chilton, Futures Investor and Customer Protection
Act (“FICPA”) Proposal, CFTC (2012), available at http://commoditycustomercoalition.org/wp-content/up

loads/2012/08/FICPA-3-Point-Proposal-PDF-2.pdf.
143. See Chilton & Roe, supra note 16.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. See Philip McBride Johnson, Is Insurance the Answer?, FUTURES & OPTIONS WORLD (Aug. 21, 2012),
http://www.fow.com/Article/3078030/Johnson-Is-insurance-the-answer.html.; see Alanna Byrne, Futures
Insurance Fund Idea Gains Momentum, FUTURES MAGAZINE (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.futuresmag.com/
2012/08/10/futures-insurance-fund-idea-gains-momentum.
152. Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15.
153. Public Roundtable on Customer Protection Requirements, CFTC 234–321 (Aug. 9, 2012), available
at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/transcript080912.pdf.
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prohibitive. 154 Below are the positives and negatives associated with the creation
of an industry sponsored insurance fund for customer segregated accounts.

1. Positives of an Industry Sponsored Insurance Fund
As Dan Roth, President of the NFA, has made clear, the futures markets
can only thrive if customers have confidence that their funds are safe. 155 Thus, a
market that is dependent on customer confidence needs a mechanism that
provides adequate assurance to customers that their monies will be safe from FCM
fraud and FCM failure. 156 One of the few mechanisms that can provide complete
safety for customers in this market would be the creation of an insurance fund. 157
The positive effects of the creation of an industry sponsored insurance fund are
explained below.
First and most important, an insurance fund will guarantee at least some
return of customer funds in the face of an FCM bankruptcy. 158 MF Global’s
bankruptcy trustee, James Giddens, stated that eighty percent of its “security
customers have received nearly the entirety of their account balances because of
the [SIPC] advances,” and the disbursements are still ongoing. 159 In comparison,
the majority of MF Global’s futures customers collected eighty percent of their
customer segregated funds at the end of 2012. As such, the securities customers of
MF Global had a mechanism—SIPC—to quickly restore its customer accounts
while the futures customers had to wait for the bankruptcy process to run its
course. 160
Second, the insurance fund would return confidence to the market following
the MF Global and Peregrine Financial bankruptcies. 161 An insurance fund is one
of the few solutions that could alleviate customer concerns when an FCM becomes
insolvent. 162 According to Roth, customers will continue to utilize the futures
markets in high volumes if they know that their funds will be protected by an
insurance system. 163
Third, an insurance fund would mitigate losses from the fraudulent actions
of FCMs. 164 In legal markets, such as the futures market, there will always be

154. Id; see Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 3 (testimony by Terrance Duffy, President &
CEO, CME Grp.).
155. Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 2 (testimony by Dan Roth, President & CEO of Nat’l
Futures Ass’n).
156. See id.
157. See Chilton & Roe, supra note 16; Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 1–2 (testimony by
John Roe, Co-Founder, Commodity Customer Coalition).
158. See Chilton & Roe, supra note 16.
159. Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 1–2 (testimony by James Giddens, Trustee, Sec.
Investor Prot. Act Liquidation of MF Global Inc.).
160. See id at 1.
161. Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 3 (testimony by Terrance Duffy, President & CEO,
CME Grp.) (“An industry-funded insurance program covering fraud and failure . . . would certainly boost
confidence but needs to be balanced against known negatives.”); see Byrne, supra note 151; see Johnson, supra
note 151.
162. See Collins & McFarlin, supra note 49.
163. See id.
164. Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 1–2 (testimony by John Roe, Co-Founder, Commodity
Customer Coalition). “The only mechanism which can mitigate the impact of fraudsters is account insurance.”
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wrongdoers that avoid being discovered for a time. 165 Increased regulatory
protections are necessary, but not every fraud in the market will be discovered
quickly. 166 As a result, no matter how solid the regulatory scheme, there is always
room for someone to engage in fraudulent acts at the expense of customers. 167
Consequently, customers need, and many want, an insurance fund as a safety net
to protect themselves from wrongdoers in the futures market. 168

2. Drawbacks of Industry Sponsored Insurance Fund
An industry sponsored insurance fund, like all insurance funds, has
unavoidable costs associated with its creation, leading many participants and
leaders of the futures market to believe the creation of such is not justified. 169
There are three major drawbacks: (i) an insurance fund creates a moral hazard;
(ii) an insurance fund creates additional costs for all market participants; and (iii)
an insurance fund is typically capped at amounts that are insufficient to suffice
fears of loss in large customer segregated accounts. These drawbacks are outlined
below.
First, the creation of an insurance fund for the futures market will create a
moral hazard for FCM customers. Indeed, customers will not perform adequate
due diligence when selecting an FCM because the insurance fund protects them. 170
If FCMs are not selected based upon stability, they could then have an added
incentive to enter into riskier trades with their proprietary funds. 171 According to
this argument, the creation of an insurance program “does nothing to reduce the
risks of customer funds being mishandled by FCMs.” 172 But the moral hazard
concern is inherent in most forms of insurance. 173
A second concern with an industry sponsored insurance fund is that the
initial insurance fund costs will be spread to all futures market participants. 174
For example, under Commissioner Chilton’s plan, each FCM will have to
contribute one-half percent of their futures revenues to the creation of the initial
insurance fund. 175 It is likely that these fees will be passed through to the FCMs’
customers. 176 Higher transaction costs for market participants, especially
commercial hedgers and other market participants who use the futures market to
hedge commercial risks, could create an incentive for these market participants to
165. See id.
166. Id. at 1–2, 4.
167. See id.
168. See id.; see Chilton & Roe, supra note 16.
169. See Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 3 (testimony by Terrance Duffy, President &
CEO, CME Grp.); see Collins & McFarlin, supra note 49.
170. See Byrne, supra note 151; Philip McBride Johnson, Former CFTC Head Offers MF Global Solution,
FUTURES MAGAZINE (Jan. 1, 2012), http://www.futuresmag.com/2012/01/01/former-cftc-head-offers-mf-globalsolution.
171. See Byrne, supra note 151; see Johnson, supra note 170.
172. E-Mail Interview with Philip McBride Johnson, Former Comm’r, CFTC (Sept. 16, 2012, 9:50 AM) (on
file with author).
173. Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 239 (1996); Rebecca Duffy, Note:

The Moral Hazard of Increased Deposit Insurance: What the 1980s Savings and Loan Crisis Can Teach Us
About Responding to the Current Financial Crisis, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 559, 566 (2011); see Chilton & Roe, supra

note 16.
174. See Byrne, supra note 151; Johnson, supra note 170.
175. See Chilton & Roe, supra note 16.
176. See Johnson, supra note 176.
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seek other markets, such as swap markets or forward contracts, to fulfill their
commercial needs. 177 Thus, the costs involved in raising the appropriate insurance
fund could deter market participation by some of the most important futures
customers. 178
The third drawback associated with an industry sponsored insurance fund
is that insurance plans instituted in capital markets, such as the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, have caps on the amounts collected by any one
customer. 179 Indeed, Commissioner Chilton’s proposal caps the amount of recovery
from the FICPA insurance fund for any customer at $250,000. 180 Such a cap will
create anxiety in large traders who post millions of dollars as margin for their
commodity trades because they will be undeniably under-insured. 181 Thus, the
caps on recovery compared with the costs incurred in creating the initial fund
might cause the industry’s largest and most lucrative traders to leave the
commodities futures market for the private swaps markets, the private forward
contracts markets or some other investment choice. 182 The futures exchanges
would not want these large traders to leave the market. 183
B. Third Party Custodial Accounts
The drawbacks of an industry sponsored insurance fund warrant
contemplating other alternatives to protect customer segregated funds starting
with a system based on third party custodial accounts. A third party custodial
account is where a futures customer posts his or her margin to a third party
safekeeping account held at a custodial bank rather than posting margin directly
to the FCM. 184 A third party custodial account would work as follows:
[W]hen a position is put on by a customer and a . . . call is made by the clearing
house to that customer’s FCM . . . the FCM [will satisfy] the margin call to the
clearing house. . . . And the customer will post to a Tri-party account the same
amount or excess amounts of margin to be held within that custody account, which
is opened in the name of the FCM on behalf of the client in lieu of posting the
margin directly to the FCM. 185

Under the current regulatory scheme, third party custodial accounts are
prohibited by the CFTC, 186 but this could be easily fixed by amending an earlier
CFTC interpretation ruling that prohibited third party custodial accounts for
futures margins. 187 Custodial accounts would provide a high level of protection to
177. See id; E-Mail Interview with Johnson, supra note 172.
178. See id.
179. E-Mail Interview with Johnson, supra note 172; see Byrne, supra note 151.
180. See Chilton & Roe, supra note 16.
181. E-Mail Interview with Johnson, supra note 172.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. Public Roundtable on Customer Protection Requirements, CFTC 246 (Aug. 9, 2012), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/transcript080912.pdf.
185. Id.
186. James L. Carley, Amendment of Interpretation No. 10, CFTC 7 (May 5, 2005), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/files/tm/tmint-10-1.pdf (“Together with concerns regarding the risks to the general
marketplace and market users, this is persuasive that third-party custodial accounts are no longer necessary
or appropriate, except in the limited case where an FCM is precluded from holding RIC assets due to affiliation
with a RIC or its adviser.”).
187. Public Roundtable, supra note 184, at 246.
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customer funds because these funds would be completely segregated from the
FCM. 188 The complete segregation would prohibit an FCM from misusing or
misappropriating customer funds like those discovered in the MF Global and
Peregrine Financial bankruptcies. 189
Under this custodial arrangement, the FCMs would only have access to the
custodial account when the client funds are needed to reimburse the FCM who
posted a margin call to the clearing house on behalf of the customer. 190 Otherwise,
these customer funds would primarily stay segregated from the FCM in a custodial
bank, and the interaction between the customer funds, the custodial bank, and the
FCM would be outlined in a third party custodial agreement. 191 These agreements
between the parties would be optional. 192 To clarify, regulators would not force
FCMs and customers to utilize the third party custodial account system. 193

1. Benefits of a Third Party Custodial Account System
A third party custodial account system would provide many benefits. 194
First, FCMs would have limited access to customer funds and the custodial bank
would protect the customer’s account. 195 The FCM would only have access to the
customer’s custodial accounts when the FCM needed the customer funds to meet
a margin call or another arrangement designated in the third party custodial
agreement. 196
A secondary benefit of a third party custody arrangement would be that the
custodial bank could independently verify the amount of customer funds held in
the custodial account. 197 The independent verification from a party other than the
FCM gives the customer more confidence and assurance that his funds are not
being misused by an FCM. 198
Furthermore, the custodial account benefits the system as whole because
FCMs will post their own monies to clearing houses when a margin call is pending,
and the clearing houses will be fully funded throughout the entire process. The
FCM, of course, will then be able to reimburse itself by tapping into a customer’s
custodial accounts. 199 Despite these benefits, the third party custodial account
alternative also comes with some associated costs and drawbacks. 200

2. Drawbacks of a Third Party Custodial Account System
The first drawback of the third party custodial account is an important one:
although the custodial account protects a customer from fraud by an FCM, the
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 244.
See id. at 247.
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Id. at 250–51.
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See id. at 244, 247–49.
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Id. at 248.
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See id. at 247–49.
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custodial accounts do not protect customer funds from being lost if the FCM were
to go bankrupt or become insolvent. 201 Accounts held in these custodial accounts
would be customer accounts under the bankruptcy code, which would result in any
remaining available customer funds being distributed on a pro rata basis to all
customers involved. 202 Thus, the risk of losing customer segregated funds from a
defaulting FCM still looms large if the custodial account regime were adopted. 203
A second drawback of a third party custodial account system is the costs
that are involved in opening and maintaining these custodial accounts. 204 Indeed,
the costs of these custodial accounts would only allow the largest investors to
benefit from this system because maintenance and carrying fees would be
associated with these accounts. 205 Along these same lines, the custodial account
structure requires the FCMs to meet margin calls with their own separate funds
directly, because margin calls cannot be posted to a clearing house directly from a
custodial account. 206 Thus, the FCMs will need to carry a sufficient amount of
capital to meet the margin calls for customer accounts, and this could be
burdensome to smaller futures traders. 207
The last drawback of a third party custodial account could be an increase in
transactional costs associated with creating a third party agreement. 208 The
contractual nature of these agreements depend on negotiated terms and
conditions, and, due to multiple parties, the deliberations can be complex and
contentious. 209 Further, it would take more regulatory collaboration of different
government entities to coordinate policies and procedures for the custodial
accounts. 210 Regulators of both banks and FCMs would need to work together to
provide oversight to these arrangements. 211 Again, the costs of this system
outweigh the benefits, which warrants further consideration of other alternatives.
C. Customer Guaranty Fund
John Roe, of the Commodity Customer Coalition, proposed an alternative to
an industry sponsored insurance fund with an industry-funded liquidity facility,
called the Customer Guaranty Fund. 212 Although the Customer Guaranty Fund
and the Industry Sponsored Insurance Fund are similar, Roe’s plan accounts for
the differences in the commodities market and the securities market. 213 Roe says
it is unwise to base an insurance plan for the commodities market on the SIPC
framework. 214 Instead, Roe’s proposal creates a liquidity facility designed to avoid
201. Id. at 252–56.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. E-Mail Interview with Johnson, supra note 172.
205. Id.
206. See Public Roundtable, supra note 184, at 246.
207. See id. at 246, 256–57; E-Mail Interview with Johnson, supra note 172.
208. E-Mail Interview with Johnson, supra note 172.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See id.
212. See Chilton & Roe, supra note 16; Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 2–3 (testimony by
John Roe, Co-Founder, Commodity Customer Coalition).
213. Public Roundtable, supra note 184, at 300.
214. See id; see Chilton & Roe, supra note 16.
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bankruptcy proceedings, with respect to customer accounts, in the event of FCM
insolvency. 215
Under this proposal, Roe argues for the creation of a private, non-profit
corporation that will hold a guaranty fund raised from an explicit and fixed
transaction fee assessed per futures contract. 216 This nonprofit corporation would
have the power to assess fees on its members and mandate registration with the
entity. 217 After the initial fund is created, the fund would focus on “providing
liquidity to plug shortfalls in customer property, and ensure that accounts are
quickly transferred to new brokers.” 218 As such, once created, the non-profit
corporation will pay back customer funds in the event of insolvency and facilitate
customer account transfers to new brokers.
In this process, the Customer Guaranty Fund would then “[step] in the
shoes of customers by taking their claims to bankruptcy.” 219 In the bankruptcy
proceedings, the FCM must pay claims to the Guaranty Fund that, on behalf of
the customers, absorbed the initial losses (if any) of misused customer funds by
the insolvent FCMs. 220 Thus, it is imperative that the Customer Guaranty Fund
“be subrogated to customer claims so that it can recoup advances made to the
customers of a failed FCM.” 221

1. Benefits of a Customer Guaranty Fund
The Customer Guaranty Fund proposed by John Roe has many of the same
benefits associated with the creation of an insurance fund. 222 This Customer
Guaranty Fund could return confidence to the futures market while establishing
a mechanism that would protect customer segregated funds from the consequences
of FCM bankruptcy. 223 Specifically, the Customer Guaranty Fund would eliminate
an aspect of moral hazard that would be associated with an Industry Sponsored
Insurance Fund. The Customer Guaranty Fund, through its subrogated claims,
would subject a defaulting FCM to the claims of customers through the bankruptcy
process. 224 Indeed, the subrogated Customer Guaranty Fund would pursue
customers’ claims in bankruptcy and demand payment if one were available
through the bankruptcy process. 225 Thus, assuming customer accounts were not
absconded by an insolvent FCM, the Customer Guaranty Fund would likely stand
idle, and not be a participant in the bankruptcy proceedings. 226 In the event that
losses to customer funds were a result of FCM misuse, the fund would provide

215. See Public Roundtable, supra note 184, at 297–304.
216. See Chilton & Roe, supra note 16.
217. See id.
218. Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 2 (testimony by John Roe, Co-Founder, Commodity
Customer Coalition).
219. See Public Roundtable, supra note 184, at 299.
220. See id.
221. Chilton & Roe, supra note 16.
222. See id; see Byrne, supra note 151.
223. See Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 2–3 (testimony by John Roe, Co-Founder,
Commodity Customer Coalition).
224. See Public Roundtable, supra note 184, at 298–99.
225. See id.
226. See id.
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liquidity for the customers to transfer to a new broker. The Customer Guaranty
Fund would then replenish itself by making claims on the FCM as a creditor. 227
Another positive to the Guaranty Fund is that a congressional act would
not be necessary to implement this program as opposed to a mandatory industry
sponsored insurance plan. 228 The Customer Guaranty Fund would function like a
corporation, and would be owned and operated by the exchanges and the FCMs. 229
The Customer Guaranty Fund Corporation would create guidelines for
membership and would assess a transaction fee to customers so they would be
covered by the fund in the case of an FCM default. 230 Fees would cease once the
Customer Guaranty Fund produced a one percent reserve ratio of the aggregate
amount of customer segregated funds held in the commodity futures market. 231
Under Roe’s proposal, the CFTC and market exchanges seem to be the likely
candidates to set the one percent reserve ratio, and this ratio could be calculated
on the previous year’s total amount of funds held in customer segregated accounts.
This data could be obtained from, for example, the Bank for International
Settlements (“BIS”), an international financial organization. The level of details
for the reserve ratio calculation was not, at the time of the writing of this Article,
readily transparent.

2. Drawbacks of the Customer Guaranty Fund
Nevertheless, the Customer Guaranty Fund is one alternative that, in
theory, works like an industry sponsored insurance fund. 232 Consequently, many
of the same costs are associated with its creation, and these costs might deter some
of the industry’s largest traders from participating in the futures market. 233 First,
the monetary caps on a Customer Guaranty Fund will be similar to that of an
insurance fund, which creates the risk of the fund underinsuring the large amount
of funds held in customer accounts. Second, the same kind of moral hazard
associated with an insurance fund can be found when creating this kind of
liquidity fund where customers do not perform their due diligence in selecting
FCMs. Finally, the costs associated with transaction based assessments on each
trade to build the Customer Guaranty Fund could be sufficient to deter market
participants from engaging in this kind of customer protection fund.
D. Central Customer Funds Repository
After the collapse of MF Global, former CFTC Chairman Philip McBride
Johnson proposed the idea of a Central Customer Funds Repository (“CCFR”). A
CCFR would be a regulated and licensed private corporation that would hold
customer segregated funds independent from respective FCMs and it would
directly interact with the clearing organizations to pay and collect funds for
227.
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231.
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futures transactions. 234 After these transactions are settled, the independent
entity would remit these funds directly to the customers. 235 This new entity would
house customer funds and eliminate a substantial amount of risk associated with
FCMs holding customer segregated funds. 236
Johnson suggests that the CCFR could adopt a structure where the FCMs
would be the owners of the Repository while separate, independent management
would be contracted out to an experienced risk management organization. 237 The
sole business of the CCFR, however, would to be to receive, disburse, and manage
customer funds of futures traders. 238 Laws and regulations will need to change to
ensure that the CCFR is an affiliate of the FCMs protecting the CCFR from
liabilities attributable to the FCM. 239
The CCFR would function as follows. Futures customers would still have a
regular relationship with their FCMs. 240 However, when a customer initially
opens an account with the FCM, the customer would also open an account with
the CCFR, which would directly control all funds transfers. 241 From the CCFR
account, the CCFR would handle all the transactions associated with the various
clearing houses. 242 For this system to work, the CCFR would need to collaborate
with the FCMs to find out the real time data on activity occurring in each customer
account that affects what it needs to receive and disburse to the appropriate
clearing houses. 243 As a result, the FCM would need to provide the CCFR with full
access to its databases of customer accounts. 244

1. Advantages of the CCFR
The advantage of the CCFR is that an FCM would not have direct access to
customer funds when, if at all, it was facing an imminent insolvency. Customer
funds would be totally separated from the FCM, and the CCFR would directly
interact with the DCO when one of DCO clearing members is under financial
distress. As such, customer accounts are better protected from misuse when a
distinct and separate entity is interfacing with the DCO directly. The CCFR and
not the FCM would post maintenance margin with the DCO. The FCM would not
be the party that would channel the money to the DCO as it does in third party
custodial accounts. This approach makes customer monies totally segregated from
FCMs which eliminates the possibility of FCM misuse. Thus, the CCFR decreases
the possibility of default and malfeasance risk associated with an FCM and
customer segregated funds.
234. Johnson, supra note 17.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1–2.
238. Id. at 2.
239. Id.
240. Id. “Customers would continue to forge a relationship with a broker. The terms of account would be
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2. Concerns of a CCFR
The issues associated with the creation of the CCFR are (i) whether the
CCFR is feasible under the current regulatory and statutory regime; (ii) whether
the CCFR would make any profit in handling the futures customers’ funds; and
(iii) whether the FCMs would be willing to agree to this kind of arrangement. 245
As for the first issue, Johnson’s proposes a slight alteration in the regulatory
structure. 246 Under current law, FCMs presumably handle segregated customer
funds, unless there is written acknowledgment explaining that the third party
bank, trust company, or clearing organization is holding customer funds on behalf
of the FCM as a holding account for these specific funds. 247 This presumption
would need to be changed to allow the customer funds to be handled and invested
by the CCFR, rather than leaving control of the funds with the FCM. 248
Nevertheless, the change in law would be welcomed by the industry because the
CCFR does not impose an additional cost on traders in creating a protective
insurance or guaranty fund.
In regards to the second and third issue, Johnson’s proposal notes that the
CFTC estimates that there is nearly $200 billon in customer segregated accounts
in the futures commodity markets, and these funds could readily be invested by
the CCFR in authorized securities. 249 Thus, it is more than likely that the CCFR
would turn a gross profit from the return associated with the investment of
customer funds. 250 FCMs will lose access to a significant portion of income from
investing customer segregated funds. 251 Johnson argues this concern can be
ameliorated by suggesting that the CCFR divide its investment income equally
with FCMs in exchange for the FCM opening their entire database to the CCFR. 252
The exchange will be fair because the CCFR will need to utilize broker operating
systems to manage its daily business, which lightens the work load for the FCM,
and the FCM will get a share of the income generated from the investment of
customer segregated funds. 253 Also, FCMs will be enticed into this kind of an
agreement with the CCFR because they would reduce their administrative and
operating costs associated with handling customer funds. 254
V. Recommendation for the Futures Commodity Market
and Customer Segregated Funds
A. Introduction
Customers of the futures commodity market want more protection for their
customer funds. 255 The CFTC and the SROs have taken steps to provide more
245.
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regulatory protection to these funds, but more can be done to quickly inject
confidence into a market that has taken serious blows recently. 256 Customer
confidence is necessary; the market needs a mechanism that will alleviate
customer concerns about a defaulting FCM misusing its customer funds. 257 Thus,
the question turns on what protective mechanisms outlined above could be
implemented so the aggregate of market participants, large and small, would be
satisfied with the changes adopted and would be comfortable with the imposed
cost of a possible solution.
The tolerance of additional costs for market participants is a key issue in
deciding the optimal solution for the protection of customer segregated funds in
the event of an FCM default. First, all traders want to ensure that their customer
funds will not be mishandled or lost by FCMs who are participating in risky
business practices. 258 This concern impacts small to medium size traders who are
using the futures market to hedge market risk in physically settled commodity
futures contracts. The small traders will be more affected than large traders
because the additional resources needed to implement a protection mechanism for
customer segregated accounts will likely impact the pricing of derivatives. Yet,
these traders are willing to incur the additional cost associated with an industry
sponsored insurance fund or a guaranty fund because they might not be willing to
take on the additional risk that their funds could be absconded. Thus, they would
prefer a market alternative that guarantees their funds would not be lost in light
of an insolvent FCM. 259 Although larger traders would also be concerned of
recovery monies lost to an insolvent FCM, they could reduce their exposure by
entering alternative positions in the market or by absorbing the trading losses
with trading profits. The larger traders also have the resources to conduct a large
amount of research and development when selecting an FCM, which limits their
exposure to insolvent FCM.
On the other hand, the larger traders in the commodity market are less
likely to tolerate the additional cost placed on them from the creation of an
industry sponsored insurance fund or a third party custodial account. 260 The
additional cost placed on the larger traders creates an incentive for them to seek
lower cost alternatives that would sufficiently meet their commercial needs, i.e.,
the private swap market or forward contracts. 261 Thus, Congress and the federal
regulators must consider these two countervailing interests when contemplating
a new protection for customer segregated funds.
B. Short Term Proposal and Long Term Consideration for the Protection of
Customer Funds in the Commodities Futures Market
256. See Hearing on Futures Markets, supra note 15, at 4 (testimony by John Roe, Co-Founder,
Commodity Customer Coalition).
257. See id. at 2, 4 (testimony by Dan Roth, President & CEO of Nat’l Futures Ass’n, testimony by John
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This Article recommends that for new protections for customer segregated
funds is derived from the alternatives discussed above by industry leaders, and
the existence of the divergent interests between market participants in the
commodity futures market. The proposal is meant to reduce the concerns of all
market participants while speaking to futures traders of all sizes and wealth. This
recommendation addresses a short-term proposal and a long term consideration.
Indeed, in the short term, an Optional Customer Guaranty Fund, similar to
the one discussed above, must be created. 262 However, the Optional Customer
Guaranty Fund would differ from Roe’s plan by making the participation in the
Customer Guaranty Fund an optional right granted to the customers of the
commodity futures market. Each customer would have the opportunity to choose
whether he would like to be protected by an industry guaranty fund in the event
of a default by an FCM. Of course, this optional feature allows the market
participants to decide the amount of protection they want for the customer
segregated funds and the amount of cost they want to incur with each futures
trade. 263 A transactional fee and a membership fee would be implemented on the
trades of customers who decide to participate in the Optional Customer Guaranty
Fund. If a futures customer does not want to participate in the Optional Customer
Guaranty Fund, he will not have a transactional and membership fee assessed on
his trades.
If a customer account opts in to the protection provided by the Customer
Guaranty Fund, then he would be assessed a transaction fee for each futures
contract that he entered. 264 Also, the FCMs would be charged a membership fee to
be a member of the Customer Guaranty Fund Corporation. 265 These fees would
accumulate into a pool and would cease when a one percent reserve ratio was
reached. The ratio would be created by the CFTC, and it would be based on the
previous year’s total amount of customer segregated funds held by FCMs. If,
however, a holder of a customer segregated account opts out of the protection or
fails to communicate with the Customer Guaranty Fund Corporation, he will not
be assessed any transactional fee, and will only be subject to the fees charged by
his FCM for performing the transaction. These customers who opt out will not be
protected by the Customer Guaranty Fund in the event their FCM collapses and
there is a shortfall in customer segregated funds.
In the event of an FCM default, the optional Customer Guaranty Fund will
provide liquidity to customers who have opted in and have decided that the
benefits of trading are more than the applicable transaction and membership fee.
The Optional Customer Guaranty Fund will allow these customers to be
transferred to a stable FCM if their respective FCM has become insolvent. 266 The
Guaranty Fund Corporation will record and account for the customers who have
opted into the program so they know how much insured customer funds were held
in certain FCMs, and who those customers are specifically. This Customer
Guaranty Fund will also step into the shoes of those qualifying customers in the
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bankruptcy proceeding. 267 Optional guaranty protection for customer segregated
funds is a solution that covers the interests of large and small traders. The larger
traders will be able to avoid the associated costs of an optional industry sponsored
guaranty fund by opting out of the protection provided. Thus, large traders will
not have to consider fleeing the commodity futures market in order to meet their
financial needs at the most cost effective method. 268 The smaller traders,
alternatively, will be able to opt in to the guaranty fund program, and their
confidence in the markets will increase. 269 Each smaller trader of customer
segregated funds will be protected from FCM default by incurring additional costs
on their transactions. 270
The optional aspect of this Article’s solution is what makes this solution
more feasible than the Industry Sponsored Insurance Fund and the Guaranty
Fund promoted by Roe. The additional costs of having a protective fund can be
avoided by the larger traders while the smaller traders, in exchange for a fee, can
have protection against an FCM’s insolvency. This makes for an optimal solution
where customer funds would be protected if FCMs mishandle their customer
segregated funds. Further, the Optional Guaranty fund is superior to a third party
custodial account because the Optional Guaranty Fund will allow those who opt
in to avoid bankruptcy proceedings while avoiding the cost associated with
creating a custodial account. Thus, in light of the MF Global and Peregrine
Financial debacles, each individual investor will be able to decide whether he is
willing to accept extra cost for additional protection from insolvent FCMs.
As for the long term consideration for the protection of customer segregated
funds, the industry should implement one of the full segregation models explained
above. 271 The CCFR should be adopted because it is the only model that provides
full segregation of customer funds and would be accessible for all traders in the
futures market. 272 The industry needs to implement the CCFR because such a
repository would eliminate most of the risks associated with FCM default and the
misuse of customer segregated funds. 273 The most significant change the CCFR
would bring is that margin would be posted by the CCFR while the customer
segregated funds would be fully segregated from the FCMs. 274 Indeed, the CCFR
would post margin on behalf of the customer to the DCO, and the customer funds
would be totally protected from FCM malfeasance. 275 Every other alternative
deliberated will not sufficiently remedy the risk of an FCM mishandling customer
funds when it becomes insolvent because in each solution above, the FCM still has
access to the funds when it is demanded to post margin with a DCO. Thus, the
FCMs could still misuse these funds when it is in their possession and they are
facing insolvency. 276
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Specifically, a Tri-Party Custodial system might only be feasible for the
largest traders of the commodity futures market because of the high expense
involved and the complex contractual rights associated with the maintenance of
these accounts. 277 A CCFR plan can also come with complex contractual rights.
However, a CCFR and an FCM relationship can be outlined by a congressional
made standardized, non-negotiable contract, which would come with less cost than
a third party custodial contract. The CCFR is the appropriate full segregation
mechanism that needs to be implemented as a reasonable long term solution to
fully protecting customer funds in the commodity futures market, and is the only
viable solution that promotes a full segregation model.
Further, an industry sponsored insurance fund and a customer guaranty
fund do little to pacify the concern of FCMs misusing customer segregated
funds. 278 Rather, these alternatives merely provide a protection mechanism if an
FCM is found to mishandle customer funds. 279 The CCFR, on the other hand,
provides a full segregation model that eliminates an FCM’s ability to misuse
customer funds. 280 This is why the aforementioned Optional Guaranty Fund
should be eliminated once Congress implements the CCFR. A phase out plan of an
optional guaranty, described below, should be used when the CCFR is established.
The CCFR eliminates an FCM’s ability to misuse customer funds while also
providing protection from an FCM that has become insolvent. 281 Thus, the CCFR
is the superior model in light of protecting customer segregated funds.
C. Proposal: Phasing of Short and Long Term Solutions
Once the CCFR is functional, the Optional Guaranty Fund would remain in
existence for three years. In these three years, regulators and Congress could
tweak the problems associated with the CCFR. After year three, the Optional
Guaranty fund model will begin a phase out process, and customer funds would,
by law, be transferred to the CCFR by the FCMs. Of course, those customers not
participating in the Optional Guaranty Fund would be mandated to have their
FCMs transfer their funds to the CCFR. After this transfer, the Optional Guaranty
Fund Corporation would be dissolved, and all customer funds would be held by the
newly created CCFR.
VI. Conclusion
After the bankruptcies of MF Global and Peregrine Financial Group, the
customers of the commodity futures market were shaken, and their trust in the
market evaporated. Industry regulators have responded with great systematic
changes to the regulatory regime, but customers seem to want more protection for
their customer funds. In spring 2013, the Futures Industry Association (“FIA”),
CME Group, the NFA, and the Institute for Financial Markets (“IFM”) examined
the possibility and available alternatives of an investor protection fund for the
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futures markets. At the time of this writing, the industry is awaiting a definite
proposal by these organizations for the feasibility of an investor protection fund.
Futures market regulators have collaborated to create safeguards for customer
funds; however, market participants await a concrete proposal from these trade
and self-regulatory organizations for additional protection for customers. 282
Industry leaders have proposed and deliberated a wide range of ideas for
protection as described in this Article, yet there has been no indication whether
an investment protection fund of any sort will be pursued. 283
Though the industry will consider the alternatives considered in this
Article, any new regime undertaken will need to weigh the cost and benefits
related to all market participants. Larger traders in the commodities futures
market do not want to be burdened by unreasonable additional cost while the
smaller traders want their customer funds to be fully protected in the event of an
FCM collapse. For immediate protection of customer funds, the futures market
should implement an Optional Guaranty Fund to remedy concerns of misuse of
customer funds. As a long term solution, a Central Customer Fund Repository
should be created for the protection of customer funds. This mechanism would
provide the highest level of protection for customer segregated funds, and this
would inject confidence into the commodities futures market.
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